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ABSTRACT
This study examines the effect of automation on operational risk (OpRisk) measurement in a
South African bank. It uses historical process risk loss data from the first quarter (2013Q1)
derived from the automated trade amendment tracker (ATAT) database – a computerised
tool designed to automate the collection of internally generated OpRisk events at the bank
in question. The results indicate that a Value–at–Risk (VaR) estimate for OpRisk largely
depends on the accuracy of the loss data. Capital adequacy is determined using this
estimate of VaR, suggesting that the ATAT device used in operational risk measurement
improves on investment services activity in South Africa. Finally, it appears that risk
management practices in the South African banking industry are more concerned about
traditional operational risk management (ORM) rather than the determination of OpRisk
VaR as it becomes a matter of great concern for financial institutions (FI’s) across the globe.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose of the Study
The advent of the computer in the 1960s, worldwide, brought about the biggest change in
banking since ledgers were mechanised, and set off a revolution in financial products/service
offerings that still continues today. Automation via computers emerged a decade later in
South Africa. The longer it took for computers to arrive in South Africa, the more there
was to gain from the experience of others and from advances made in computer construction
and techniques.
In recent years it has turned out that many phenomena in finance can be described
successfully by mathematical models. A model is a small replica of real-life; through modeling
we attempt to mimic a real-life scenario to a given degree of certainty, subject to limitations
and/or given assumptions. The assumptions must make sense, if not, nobody will use it
(the model). Take the use of normal distributions in modeling the behaviour of stock prices
in financial markets which turned out to be a big problem as stock prices can rarely be
predicted by the models used to forecast their future prices.
Computers are now an integral part of the banking industry due to their power and ability to
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automate processes. The more sophisticated and complex the industry becomes, the greater
the need for sophisticated computer hardware and software packages to handle the day to
day running of a financial institution (FI) such as a bank. In this study, historical operational
loss data is taken, and through the use of mathematics and the computer, frequency and
severity distributions are fitted to the data, then summed up or aggregated to find maximum
loss due to operational risk (OpRisk) at a South African bank. It goes without saying that
this procedure is easier said than done.
More often than not there is no exact analytic solution representing the total aggregate loss
distribution. Numerical approximation techniques (computer algorithms) successfully bridge
the divide between theory and implementation for the problems of mathematical analysis.
It has been amply documented that the Monte Carlo1method, Panjer’s recursive approach,
and the inverse of the characteristic function can be used to provide an approximation of the
compound loss distribution (Franchot et al (2001); Aue & Kalkbrener (2007); Panjer (2001);
& others). Monte Carlo simulation is popular in the literature, and has been proposed in
this study as it is has received most attention.
Broadly speaking, banking operations consist of traditional concepts such as, authorisation to
commit a firms money, protection of assets, complete and accurate recording of transactions,
efficient due diligence operations when opening new relationships, orderly and timely
processing of and clearance of transactions and reconciliation of individual trade details to a
firms records (King, 1999). A FI relying on simplistic and traditional techniques in managing
their operations stands the risk of the potential loss of competitiveness in the marketplace
1 A random sampling method whereby computer software simulation packages generate random values
representing samples from a theoretical distribution
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due to inadequate technology, both for maintaining the bank and servicing its customers.
Also this risk is often associated with the need to protect systems and the data contained in
them from unauthorised access and tampering. In fact this area of risk control could set one
bank apart from the rest; effective maintenance of banking procedures could unleash optimal
performance in teams and individuals whilst business objectives are achieved, realising the
full potential of the organisation. An imbalance of skills in the labour force and adequate
technological advances can lead to a breakdown in banking services activity.
It is important to note that the risks associated with operational errors are wide ranging
and may or may not bear profit and loss (P&L) implications. Ultimately, we want to measure
the impact of operational errors upon an FI’s P&L, in a FI these risks are always initiated
at the dealing phase. Figure 1.1 is a detailed diagram of the operational tasks, controls
and reports performed throughout the life cycle of a deal/trade in an typical investment
banking process. The reporting lines from deal origination to settlement are formed through
correct relationships between the staff and duties of front/middle/back office. In our study
the middle office (MO)/back office (BO) will to a large extent be instrumental in the process
of managing the risk, hence are only involved after the risk has been assumed, therefore
front office (FO)/dealing staff is responsible for operational events to be included in the
classification of the losses that directly affect the P&L, such as booking errors and/or some
but not all, system problems.
Computers have to a great degree removed the extent to which errors are generated through
the banks operations, and enabled organisations to efficiently meet and adapt to internal
operational risk practices as well as external regulations. However, they have also opened up
new ways in which errors can be generated, with arguably more severe downstream effects
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than in the past, such as in the potential of accumulated losses during system downtime
or in the generation of multitudes of P&L losses when unauthorised trades are booked due
to computer bugs, notably observed in modern arbitrage trading platforms. A computer
trading error was revealed in March 1997 in an investigation led by the Securities and Futures
Authority in the UK (the former City of London Regulator, since superseded by the Financial
Services Authority) in rogue trading in a program trade at SBC Warburg. (A program trade
is a transaction where one agent, generally a fund, choses another agent, generally a bank
or a broker, to sell part of its shares in the market at a day and hour determined by market
prices). The program trading error that made SBC Warburg the subject of the investigation
is thought to have cost it no more than £5mil (Cruz, 2002, pg. 21).
Downstream effects of the post automation phase differ in magnitude to those in the past, in
that there was less computation then and the processing of information leading to operational
losses were carried out manually.
1.2 Context of the Study
Since the mid-1980s, there have been some spectacular losses in financial markets. Of all
risks associated with these losses, operational risk (OpRisk) can be the most devastating
and at the same time, the most difficult to anticipate. Managerial and regulatory focus
on OpRisk has been heightened, following a number of very costly and highly publicized
operational events (Cummings, Christopher & Ran, 2006).
The most prominent examples of losses due to OpRisk have been “rogue trader ”cases.
These are thought to be intelligent, articulate and charming individuals, but may prove to
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be criminally minded insiders acting on their own, who stand out due to their extreme past
and/or on-going successes, enabling them to engage in their underhanded practices for years
without raising any suspicion. When these losses materialise, the appearance can result
in sudden and dramatic reductions in the value of the firm. Examples of famous losses
(representing a broad range of losses) below contextualise rogue trading activities and the
impact of the realised losses on the FI’s, therefore giving impetus to the need of containing
OpRisk.
* Toshihide Iguchi, a star bond trader at Daiwa Bank confessed in 1995, that he had
forged more than 30,000 trading slips which made it appear as though he was generating
half of his employers trading profits. In his confession, the reality was that he was hiding
more than $1,1bn in losses accumulated over a decade.
* In the same year, Nick Leeson of Barings Bank, made a name for himself by taking
bad bets and parking his losses in a fabricated separate account. By February, this
account was hiding losses of $827m. Systems within Barings were so inadequate that
nobody knew what he was doing. This eventually wiped out the 200-year-old British
merchant bank due to an accumulated total trading loss of $1.4bn.
* A year later,Yasuo Hamanaka, Sumitomo Corporation’s chief copper trader was caught
hiding losses through unauthorised trades after he tried to manipulate the market. His
trades helped send the copper price to record highs at the time, only for prices to
tumble down once his secret was uncovered. His was the biggest trading loss at the
time amounting to $2.6bn.
* John Rusnak, a US-based foreign exchange trader for Allied Irish Bank lost money to
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the bank. Upon realizing his loss and due to fear of losing his reputation as a solid
performer, he spent five years trying to cover his losses by creating fictitious trades. He
would end up costing the lender $700m when his unauthorised speculative activities
were exposed in 2002.
* Vince Ficarra and David Bullen of the National Australian Bank, were in 2003 found
guilty of unauthorised trading and falsely inflating profits. Their team had broken
their trading limits on about 800 occasions and the two had been found to have falsely
inflated profits just minutes before the end of the bank’s financial year enabling them
to trigger bonuses.
* Jerome Kerviel began in Societe Generale’s MO and was well versed in the company
policies in approving and regulating trading among its brokers. He was soon promoted
to trading. He had extensive knowledge of the computers and systems used in the
company. Through this knowledge, he conducted tens of billions of dollars’ worth of
unauthorised trades. He hid his early gains by creating fake offsetting trades in the
computers systems and logs. When the fraud appeared and managers tried to close
out the uncovered bets in January 2008, he was to cost SocGen a record $7.2bn.
* Kweku Adoboli, an ETF trader at UBS began covering up his trading losses in 2008
using his knowledge of the back office to sidestep compliance controls. When he made
a $400,000 loss on a trade, he opted to hide his loss rather than tell his manager. By
June 2011 he had racked up $2.3bn in trading losses which he confessed to via email
sending shock waves through the bank.
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The key lesson to be learned from these losses is the importance of internal controls. A
trader in a FI should be allowed to take positions on the future direction of relevant market
variables. However, Hull (2012) correctly argues that the sizes of the positions that can be
taken should be limited and the systems in place should accurately report the risks being
taken. The risks taken by traders, the models used, and the amounts of different types of
business done, should all be controlled.
It is essential that all FI’s define in a clear and unambiguous way, limits to the financial risks
that can be taken and it is equally important to have procedures and practices that ensure
that the limits are adhered to. Limits are usually established on the basis of the amounts of
exposure, measured in value–at–risk (VaR), that a FI is prepared to risk for, say the amount
of foreign exchange (FX) paper allowed to be held over a certain period.
Suppose a trader sees an arbitrage opportunity (i.e. an opportunity to enter into a contract
at no cost, no chance of making a loss and at a greater than or zero probability of making a
profit) on a 1 year forward on the price of gold and the annual interest charged on borrowed
funds (suppose the cost of borrowed funds is much lower than the return on the 1 year
forward). Suppose it were such a profitable opportunity that he/she wanted to buy as many
ounces of gold as possible and go short futures contracts on the same number of ounces,
realising a guaranteed profit in a years’ time. The trader will have borrowing limits based
on the trading book i.e. the amount of borrowed funds.
The opportunity may appear to be so attractive that he may be tempted to exceed his daily
borrowing limit in order to realise a considerable profit. If the trader were to exceed this limit
without being given prior approval to do so, their actions would effectively constitute a breach
of company financial policy and hence a potential operational loss event. Warning signs
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such as the exceeding of risk limits or considerable increases in profit should be investigated
alongside each other. An automated OpRisk framework should be able to flag this issue,
providing management with an early warning signal underscoring those areas where pre-
defined limits are breached and thus highlighting potential operational (e.g. rogue trader)
losses in a timely fashion.
FI’s operating as intermediaries, such as those in the banking industry, are special because
of their ability to efficiently transform financial claims of household savers into claims issued
to corporations, individuals, and governments. A FI’s ability to evaluate information and
to control and monitor borrowers, allows it to transform claims at the lowest possible cost
to all parties. This comes at cost in the form of risk. One of the specific types of risk is
based on the creditworthiness = credit risk of the borrower: It is the risk that the borrower
may default on repayment of a loan, otherwise known as a credit default. Another risk type
of major concern is market risk: The risk related to the uncertainty of a FI’s earnings on
it’s trading portfolio caused by changes in market conditions, such as the price of an asset,
interest rates, market volatility, and market liquidity.
Large operational errors highlighted by “rogue trader ”events, brought awareness of risks
that significantly impact the performance of a FI other than credit and market risks. A
recent survey (Cruz, 2002) showed that banks estimate their risks are divided into market
risk (50%), credit risk (15%) and operational risk (35%). A common misconception amongst
risk professionals is to take the complement of losses attributed to market and credit risk
and regard them as losses resulting from OpRisk, stating: “it is every risk not included in
market and credit risk”. This definition is too broad and makes the task of creating an
OpRisk database unmanageable.
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 13
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) a universally agreed
definition of operational risk is: “The risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed
internal processes, people and systems or from external events”. Therefore, OpRisk
is related to losses originated from operational errors of any sort that affect the P&L of the
FI.
Any type of FI will often face OpRisk long before it embarks on its first market trade or
credit transaction. Practitioners of risk management have attempted to identify and measure
OpRisk in the past. One of the more common approaches has been to try to apply techniques
from areas of credit and market risk to the problem of fitting and modeling OpRisk, with
limited degrees of success. One of the reasons for this is the general lack of publicly available
data for operational losses, in direct contrast to market and credit risk, for which data of
publicly traded companies is widely available.
Considering the inherent scarcity of OpRisk data, qualitative aspects such as the generation
of scenarios, the development of a program for key risk indicator’s (KRI’s) and/or expert
judgement of reasonableness have been proposed to make up for the shortfall in OpRisk
databases. This, besides the fact that several banks have developed state-of-the-art market
and credit risk measurement techniques which are quantitative in nature, and clearly more
superior to qualitative techniques.
It is important to note, as illustrated by Cruz (2002), that when a dealer incorrectly states
a valuation parameter such as the volatility of a deal, the reason behind the operational
event is known, which is incorporated in calculating the risk, measured in VaR, but the
qualitative reason will not be incorporated into the measure, except as a technical note. Not
all operational risk loss data lends itself easily to quantitative analysis (Chavez–Demoulin,
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Embrechts & Neslehova, 2006). For example, if a client were to open a legal suit against the
bank, who upon investigation find that the root cause of risk results from of lack of experience
of staff in dealing with certain products, i.e. legal risk defies a precise quantitative analysis.
The qualitative approach by nature lacks an effective relationship for control, and has a high
degree of subjectivity. The study focuses on the quantitative aspects of modeling OpRisk
using internal loss data alone as the objective is just to arrive at an operational VaR measure,
hence qualitative aspects are beyond our scope.
The credit and financial crisis of 2007–2009 has focused attention on current practices of
risk measurement and management in financial markets. Regulatory authorities throughout
the world have adopted VaR to measure the exposure faced by FI’s (Lehman, Groenendaal,
& Nolder, 2012). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) is one
such authority: It is a comprised of a group of officials who collectively form a regulatory
structure in the financial services. Their role is to set out guidelines on the amount of
regulatory capital required of financial companies to form capital reserves to cover risks in
the financial services sector. The Capital Adequacy Accord (Basel I) was implemented in
1988, and an update to it came into effect in June 2006. The New Capital Adequacy Accord
(Basel II) focused primarily on the definition of risk-weighted assets, and introduced a
framework of risk management techniques with specific emphasis on OpRisk, as a portion of
the requirements to the accord, which specifically deal with credit and market risks, were
already addressed in Basel I.
The three pillar approach was introduced with Basel II. Pillar I is a minimum capital
requirement, calculated in different ways for institutions of differing sophistication. OpRisk
modeling is of concern here; central to this and to the content of this study is the perceived
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triumph of complex quantitative procedures over respect for and reliance on seasoned
professional judgement. Exciting new approaches to OpRisk have been introduced in the
early days of Basel II. The first formal system adopted by the Basel Committee required
certain institutions to calculate a 99.9th percentile, left-tail confidence interval in deriving
the VaR measure. The advanced measurement approach (AMA) had been thought to be the
more advanced. Management is mostly free to choose among various methods for estimating
this, including historical simulations and Monte Carlo simulations. The idea was that the
most complex banks would adopt the AMA, which would then provide an incentive for less
sophisticated banks to follow suit and make progress to improve their risk management.
Capital adequacy is determined using this estimation of VaR.
Pillar II is a supervisory review process through which additional capital requirements can
be imposed and Pillar III relates to market discipline and assumes transparency in risk
disclosures will help keep banks in line by enabling investors to reward or punish FI’s on the
basis of their risk profile.
This is a study toward the determination of whether the current regulatory scrutiny on
OpRisk is justified based on the use of a quantitative approach to measure OpRisk where
an internal OpRisk management database, namely the automated trade amendment tracker
(ATAT), is used to collect internal loss data in a South African bank. The idea of using
a computerised device to obtain an automated data feed to collect operational loss data is
central in determining the accuracy of OpRisk in that considerable challenges exist, which are
reduced due to automation, in collating large volumes of data into a central depository. The
development of a risk management platform which has the ability to capture loss data with
a high degree of reliability/accuracy can be decisive in making an OpRisk project successful.
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1.3 Problem statement
1.3.1 Main Problem
Although there are processes within banks whose objectives are to put detailed procedures
and practices in place, through which the risks of the business are kept within acceptable
bounds; operational events leading to unexpected losses regularly occur, defeating the very
objectives of the internal control frameworks set by senior management necessary to send
an accurate message to staff.
Furthermore, the foundation of internal control rests on managements vision of the
importance of controls. Without a proper definition and tone from the top it is difficult
and perhaps even impossible to set up a good control structure. OpRisk is the oldest type
of risk facing FI’s and is a key source of risk, leading to a breakdown in investment services
activity.
1.4 Significance of the Study
The majority of banking institutions in South Africa rely on the manual capture of records
for the tracking of trade adjustments to treasury systems. The records are usually captured
in the form of an email, telephone call, or by verbal instruction which can lead to less than
ideal choices of managing OpRisk. This seems to be quite outrageous! Even more surprising
is that automated tracking devices are not common. It is clear that using an email to track
records becomes a cumbersome process as the number of records increases, not to mention
through telephone calls or verbal instruction. The most preferred manner in which to track
these records is clearly not being prioritised.
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Originally, MO/BO would have been responsible for the deal capture of all details as
automated FO systems did not exist. Thus, once the dealer had manually entered the basic
data, MO/BO staff would manually enter all the other details. Today many banks have
complete software solutions to capturing the life of a deal, hence deal capture is executed
in the FO via the FO system. Some of the FO systems are so advanced and sophisticated
that the system can be trusted to capture the whole life cycle of the deal. Figure 1.1 is a
detailed diagram of process tasks and controls used to compile a list of control points and
related risks in the trading process.
Trading in financial securities in any financial market is carried out in the FO. Here the deal
is originated and captured in the FO trade entry systems by FO staff to reflect what has
been agreed. The purpose of the MO/BO is to ensure that the trade details are checked
and confirmed to ensure accuracy and validity. The proper application and implementation
of MO duties is to ensure that accurate P&L numbers are generated, reported and agreed
with FO. In cases where the MO/BO experiences (P&L) issues relating to incompleteness or
inaccuracies in a deal as a result of a mismatch between the trade booked (booking in trade
feed) and the details agreed by the trader, a query arises. MO/BO should be able to respond
quickly to communicate the query, then be able to go “under the bonnet ”of the querying
process and fix the problem.
Suppose a deal is booked in the trade entry system and on matching the trade details and
P&L reports, MO discover that the trade had been incorrectly booked, say the notional is
booked the wrong way round (i.e. booked on the sell side when records show that it should
have been booked on the buy side) but somehow managed to slip through the preventative
web of internal controls. The actual deal P&L reported in the transaction data system will be
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Fig. 1.1: Process diagram for investment banking operations
(King, J, 2001)
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inverted, i.e. if the P&L of the deal reflects a profit of $100 in the system, it should in reality be
reflecting a loss of $100 and vice versa, a $200 discrepancy!. This poses a significant potential
loss to the bank that will be keen to see the discrepancy resolved timeously. However, it is
imperative that control procedures are always adhered to and that contact between FO and
MO/BO is strictly in accordance with established lines of communication.
The trade will need to be fixed by “amending ”or manually changing the notional on the FO
system from a “sell”to a “ buy”(in forward FX swaps, amendments have to very carefully
monitored, for if the first leg had already matured and the swap details are subsequently
amended, the true P&L will be affected). Once the trade is amended (manually fixed), a
record of the amendment is stored and precautions are taken to avoid the risk of unauthorised
payments being made. The trade generation and settlement system is the last line of control
there to protect the bank, its staff and its clients generally.
Records of trade amendments reflect the chain of events leading up to and on executing the
change to trade details prior to booking. The record of the amendment usually consists of an
instruction through an approved line of communication, e.g. telephone call or email, and a
tracking log which describes the change to the trade in question. An increase in the volume
of trade amendments involves many individual records which need to be manually recorded
by MO. Keeping track of these changes quickly turns into a nightmare and the accuracy of
amendment records is easily compromised. Automated recording of the process of tracking
of trade amendment data will benefit from a computerised technology that monitors risks
associated with manual processing errors.
This study fills a gap in that it focuses on exploring the relevance of automating the function
of the tracking of changes to trade details of deals captured in FO systems, otherwise called
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trade amendments, whilst the FO system itself is adjusted for life cycle events throughout
the life of a deal. In the process, we hope to uncover sources of operational errors and
build up a database of processing errors large enough to be used in advanced techniques
of measuring the levels of OpRisk with respect to a set of deals. The method of data
collection will consequently prove that loss data is flowing with a high degree of reliability
and accuracy, as the process is automated and the data feed comes directly from the source
system. Interestingly enough, the integrity ( i.e. reliability and accuracy) of internal data is
central in providing the basis for a good quantitative measure of ex ante OpRisk, which in
turn, determines capital allocation for expected operational events.
This study will provide guidance as it will demonstrate the ability to root out and record
sources of operational errors in order to assess components leading to “best practice ”in
OpRisk control. The ATAT is a tool which is used to automate the manual processing
of amendment records and monitors processing risks in one robust software architecture.
Through designing and implementing an ATAT, it will be possible to demonstrate the
relevance of this tool, which comes with all the benefits of manual tracking systems where
reports on details of amended deals were carried out manually, and has further applications
unique to the tool itself.
Reports to management on details of amended trades is a good control. The message
from senior management and the board of directors through written policies and training
programmes should set up a good control structure for an organisation. Banking supervision
is a major part of the industry which must be observed by all stakeholders. The message set
from the top is only received as far as the reports to management show, hence the quality
of these reports inform bank supervisors whether or not bank managers comply with their
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mandate; mandates are documented along with their implications for OpRisk. King, J (2001,
pg. 37) found that the most important document relating to OpRisk at the time was the
The Framework for the Evaluation of Internal Control Systems (January 1998) wherein a
mandate for bank supervision was given.
“Principle 14: Supervisors should require that all banks, regardless of size, have
an effective system of internal controls that is consistent with the nature,
complexity, and risk of their on–and–off–balance sheet activities and that
responds to changes in the bank’s environment and conditions, in those
instances where supervisors determine that a bank’s internal control system
is not adequate (for example, does not cover all the principle contained in
this document), they should take action against the bank to ensure that the
internal control system is improved immediately.”
The ATAT is hopefully a step in the right direction at ensuring that the lead set from
top management is adhered to and fraudulent activities quickly uncovered where control
philosophies fall short, or are inconsistent with company policy. Finally, the concept of
monitoring a treasury system through an automated tracking device is a need in the market
as amongst other things it ensures that systems of internal control are operating as intended
- “quis custodiet custodes? ”(or who guards the guardians?) (King, 1999). The project will
also give an indication of how the market is changed through innovation, and the impact of
information technology on the speed of doing business.
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1.5 Delimitations of the Study
Owing to the multidimensionality of OpRisk, loss events are categorised into seven event-
type categories (Internal Fraud, External Fraud, Employment Practices and Workplace
Safety, Business disruption and System failures, Execution, Delivery & Process management,
Clients, Products and Business practices & Damage to physical assets) (Cruz, Coleman &
Salkin, 1998).
Process risk is defined as: “Losses resulting from failed transaction processing or
process management, from relations with trade counterparties and vendors
(Cummings et al, 2006), such as booking errors, failure to comply with the
transaction terms, fraud, etc.”. Again the ATAT records processing error event types,
such as amendments to incorrectly booked interest rates, start/end/value dates, or deal
cancellations, to mention a few. Our study attempts to measure OpRisk losses under the
process risk category only. The author argues that it is a convenient loss category in our case
as data captured via the treasury system is process orientated and impartial; automation
provides an electronic trail which facilitates the ease of data capture. According to ORX
(2012), the 2012 edition of the Operational Riskdata Exchange (ORX) report on operational
risk loss data findings from the 2006–2010 and 2011 surveys indicate that the process risk
category consistently accounts for the majority of operational problems, i.e. 35% of the time,
followed by cases of external fraud at a close 30%. It is therefore a convenient and useful
risk category to select as a sample as it tends to present the largest number of events and
subscribes well to the style used in the loss data extraction method ATAT platform, which
will be used in experimentation.
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The database of historical data loss events is built up over a 3 month (beginning January
2013) time span. The minimum acceptable historical observation period, proposed by the
EU directive [2000/12/EC] requires:
“Internally generated operational risk measures used for regulatory capital
calculation must be based on a minimum historical observation of 5 years
for internal loss data. When a credit institution moves to an AMA, a three
year data series is acceptable ”.
It suffices to say that the available data in our case falls short of this requirement. However,
our aim is to demonstrate that the treatment of available data lends itself to the AMA
method of calculation of VaR owing to the method of data collection, i.e. through the use of
the ATAT. The sample is drawn from operational events often related to the internal process
and may suffer from data deficiencies, such as data missing from business lines (BL) and/or
event types (ET).
Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Pre–1988, banks were regulated using balance sheet measures often applying unique metrics
and thresholds to inform decision making. The process required to identify the appropriate
metric or portfolio of metrics can be challenging, given the unique attributes of each
bank. Definitions of terms and required financial ratios varied due to differing regulatory
enforcement practices from country to country and many banks find themselves falling into
the trap of selecting the most common, rather than the most appropriate risk metric.
A common debate focuses on economic capital (EC) and risk adjusted return on capital
(RAROC), or FI’s that are heavily engaged in traditional lending activities could consider
return on asset (ROA) as the performance measure rather than the more common return on
equity (ROE), believed to be a more useful indicator (KPMG International, 2013). Clearly,
there is no worldwide response in finding the right divide between debt and equity used
in project financing as these may differ from one region to another. In practice, what the
results show is that the higher the debt the greater the chances of good return on equity
but also a higher likelihood of solvency problems, i.e. due to interest expenses on earnings
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or depreciation costs over the passage of time.
Bank leverage increased in the 1980s and the Bank of International Standards (BIS) was
set up. The Capital Adequacy Accord (Basel I) was established so that banks could
buffer against international solvency. Basel I intended to open up global competition by
minimising rules that favoured local FI’s over potential foreign competitors. Basel I meant
that banks were required to keep a portion of the depositors money of what has been lent
out to protect against credit default. According to Basel I, it is mandatory to comply with
an industry standard in calculating the required economic capital buffer for credit risk.
With off-balance sheet trading on the increase, bank trading in equity, interest rate and
exchange rate derivative products escalated throughout the 1990’s. Many of these new
innovations (later known to be derivatives) were not even in existence when Basel I was
drafted. Consequently, even if Basel I was satisfactory in safeguarding bank depositors from
traditional credit risks, their capital adequacy requirements were not sufficient to safeguard
against the market risk from derivatives trading (Eun, Resnick & Sabherwal, 2012).
An amendment to Basel I was introduced to cater for these shortcomings which came
into effect in 1998. Regulation dictates that under this amendment to Basel I, to ward
against engaging in market activities which are prone to market risk, banks were to set aside
additional capital to guard against market risk.
OpRisk, which includes matters such as computer failure, poor documentation, and fraud,
was becoming evident as a significant risk category. This increased focus on the significance
of OpRisk as a justifiable regulatory capital requirement area emanates from the key
developments in the list below:
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• An enhanced emphasis on transparency in firm financial reporting
• Rising levels of exposure to OpRisk driven by increasingly complex production
technologies used by financial services firms,
alluded to by Cummings et al (2006) and maintained in more recent reports viz., the Chartis
Research (2013):
• OpRisk is seen as the responsibility of every individual at the FI
• The influence of the chief risk officer (CRO) has increased and they are more often a
part of board level decisions
• OpRisk is accepted as a risk that affects other risk types.
This expanded view of risk reflects the type of business in which banks now engage and the
business environment in which banks operate. The framework for a New Capital Adequacy
Accord (Basel II) was prepared in June 2004, a paper on its application was endorsed in
November 2005, leading to its implementation in June 2006. In contrast to Basel I, it
cuts the opportunity for local and regional banks to grow into viable competitors to current
bigger FI’s. According to (Basel II) there is a capital charge for OpRisk.
2.2 Definition of Operational Risk
OpRisk can be regarded as a consequence of the possibility of a realised loss in value due
to an operational event. Operations are a necessary part of doing the business; therefore
there is a systematic expectation that one bears this risk. The problem faced is to be able to
distinguish what constitutes an operational loss event and how much should be attributed
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to the risk of such a loss, in the event a loss is experienced due to these failures. As the
definition implies it is not trivial to quantify OpRisk and is also a very difficult area to
manage. The scope of OpRisk data includes actual realised losses and operational events
that have the potential to lead to an operational loss. The greatest concern when dealing
with OpRisk is that historical data is often very scarce and of poor quality.
2.3 Capital Adequacy
2.3.1 A Synthesis of Concepts
It is important to note that there are two types of capital that play a role in safeguarding
banks against OpRisk, namely regulatory capital (RC) and economic capital (EC). RC is
the amount of capital a regulator requires a bank to hold to safeguard against OpRisk and is
based on the proposals of the Basel Committee with Basel II. EC is the amount of capital
a FI itself deems necessary to operate normally, given its risk profile and its state of controls.
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), there are
three procedures a FI can use in dealing with the capital requirement for their OpRisk.
The first two are top down approaches and simplistic in nature and the third approach, the
internal measurement approach (IMA) is bottom up and a lot more complex. The resulting
operational losses are used in calculating regulatory/economic capital.
The first two, the basic indicator approach (BIA) and the standardised approach (SA) are
as follows; The BIA assigns a percentage to the annual gross income of the firm as a whole
to determine the annual capital charge, while in the SA the firm is split into eight business
lines and assigned a different percentage of a three year average gross income per business
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line, the summation of which is the capital charge.
In the IMA, the bank uses its own internal loss data to calculate capital charge. Unique to
the IMA is that regulators have resolved not to put stringent controls on what IMA process to
adopt, as each bank’s internal framework has its own design. This adds flexibility in deciding
on which model a bank could use to suit their method of analysis. The more effectively a
bank manages it’s OpRisk, the less capital it is required to reserve for that risk. The advanced
measurement approach (AMA) is an IMA method which applies estimation techniques such
as Monte Carlo or historical simulations. As a result, a bank that undertakes an AMA
should fulfill the regulatory need of obtaining a more superior capital adequacy requirement
measure and may be left with more available funds, which in turn has a positive impact on
the bank’s competitiveness.
2.3.2 Theoretical Framework
Following the financial crisis, banks have begun to spend a lot of money on risk management
practices. One of the significant areas of impact has been on AMA modeling. One of the
causes is that there has been a significant increase in the number of operational events, hence
improving data points in loss data which aids in the implementation of advanced quantitative
methods such as the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA). The LDA is an AMA method whose
main objective is to provide realistic risk estimates for the bank and it’s business units based
on loss distributions that accurately reflect the underlying data. Using the ATAT dataset,
we estimate the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA) model for OpRisk for each business line
(BL) or event type (ET) combination, assuming probability distributions of the independent
identically distributed (i.i.d) severity (single event P&L impact) and one–in–a–quarter event
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frequency:
Figure 2.1 is a flowchart illustrating the LDA to OpRisk. The LDA models two primary
components of OpRisk loss data:
* Loss frequency
* Loss severity
Monte Carlo simulation is utilised to bring the two distributions together
* A large number of simulations must be run to observe a sufficient number of losses to
reasonably assess what a 1–in–1000 year event might look like
The key benefits an organisation can enjoy from deploying the ATAT are proposed to be:
• Increased accuracy and visibility of risk information. Data is collected directly from
source and a transparent view of users embedded in the system is enabled.
• The bank can apply AMA methods such as and not limited to, the Loss Distribution
Approach (LDA).
• More quickly identify and remediate deficiencies. A controlled list of reasons for
amendments and remedial action plans to reduce the time required for reconciliation
or other cross-checking requirements.
• Increased management insight by providing sources of internal loss data, risk and
control self-assessment, and KRI’s.
• Optimisation of business performance; through the analysis of information by creating
correlations between the different sources of loss data.
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Fig. 2.1: Flowchart of the Loss Distribution Model (LDA)
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• Reduce the cost and complexity of your OpRisk platform by integrating all process risk
management components on a single, coherent platform.
• Incorporate robust software architecture to contribute effectively and efficiently in
building and maintaining a strong control environment.
2.3.3 Hypothesis 1
A bank with sufficient internal data at its disposal for the implementation of quantitative
criteria for its operational risk capital requirement will benefit from the use of an AMA, as it
gives the bank more decision making options and permits the bank authorities to determine
the capital adequacy requirement themselves. This serves as the ultimate goal of a regulatory
incentive based process.
2.4 Conclusion of Literature Review
Fundamentals of risk areas in the financial services industry infer that FI’s make a conscious
decision to take on a certain amount of credit risk, market risk, and other types of risk such
as OpRisk. In managing risks, it is understandable that they take on the former two types
of risk (credit and market), and that here exposure can be effectively (ex ante) controlled,
e.g. be risk averse in providing credit, and hedge yourself against expected adverse market
movements. However, opponents of Basel II argue that OpRisk is more part of the process
and thereby somewhat inherent in conducting business. According to this interpretation,
the rational for managing OpRisk is not compelling. OpRisk differs in that it always causes
losses and not gains. Negative losses are positive gains, but because our focus is on losses,
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we will not consider, for example, errors that result in gains. Hence to the extent that
OpRisk reflects the burden of things always leading to a loss, it makes sense for a FI to make
expenditures on managing OpRisk.
Accordingly, Franchot et al (2001) acknowledge OpRisk is being explicitly concerned by
Basel II meaning it is now receiving and will receive the same regulatory treatment as
those imposed on credit and market risks. It is now becoming a market standard for banks
to demand standard quantitative computations of losses for these risk types. The AMA is
a methodology whereby a bank uses its own internal data to compute the economic capital
necessary to cover against potential operational losses. Banks are given freedom to calculate
their OpRisk capital as part of the Basel II framework – but only if they receive regulatory
approval to use the AMA. It is desirable for a bank to compute their own economic capital
requirement since regulatory capital adequacy standards almost surely produce an uneven
distribution of capital among various banks, creating an uneven playing field.
The LDA is (and will be) a powerful method for banks that want to better align their
minimum regulatory capital with economic capital, in so doing, it would also increase the
perception of fairness across banks as the capital numbers should more accurately reflect
the OpRisk component due to its strong quantitative nature. Justifying capital adequacy
numbers for OpRisk required the explanation of complicated models to senior management,
who found it difficult to rationalise the capital amounts. The wake of the financial crisis has
raised awareness of the risks, and now management sees the need to improve their assessment
of risk and have better risk management. The use of proven quantitative approaches to
OpRisk management, such as the LDA, can result in the lowering of the risk capital, hence
is an attractive return-on-investment option.
Chapter 3
METHODOLOGY
The following section describes the methodology to be followed in addressing the hypothesis
and will proceed as follows: Subsection 3.1 outlines the quantitative procedure, subsection
3.2 provides for the definition of the mathematical model, population sample and sampling
methods are presented in subsection 3.3, in 3.4 the instrument of experimentation is described
and the data gathering technique follows in 3.5.
3.1 Research Paradigm
This study uses a quantitative design to identify, analyse and describe factors contributing to
operational loss events through the use of the amendment tracking loss database framework.
The research maintains, that through this framework, an accurate association between
variables can be achieved that minimises bias and non-representativeness of the data collected
and analysed. Data is usually captured with a systematic bias. This problem is more
pronounced with OpRisk loss data. More precisely, one would expect high frequency low
severity losses to have an immaterial P&L impact hence possibly ignored, and low frequency
high severity losses to have a low probability of being reported because of the negative
attention such reports may attract to the business. A data set obtained from an automated
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feed eliminates bias and the data captured is highly representative of the actual losses, versus
their manual counterparts.
Very few banks are able to implement the LDA, due to scarcity of data. The data from the
loss database is exceptional in that it will investigate the full nature of process risk orientated
loss events and is exploratory in that it attempts to identify new knowledge and gain new
insight into the downstream effects of the factors driving these events. These effects are
calibrated through the underlying mathematical model. Through the model, it is possible
to compute the value of the two distributions, i.e. frequency and severity, contributing to
the value of the dependent variable, namely the aggregate operational loss (hence the total
required capital charge), based on a VaR measure in a controlled environment, where the
ATAT is the instrument of experimentation/control.
3.2 Research Design
The Loss Distribution Approach
We begin by defining some concepts:
• In line with Basel II, and according to Franchot et al (2001), we consider a matrix
consisting of business lines BL and (operational) event types ET . The bank estimates,
for each business line/event type (BL/ET) cell, the probability functions of the single
event impact and the event frequency for the next three months. More precisely, in
each cell of the BL/ET matrix separate distributions for loss frequency and severity are
modeled and aggregated to a loss distribution at the group level. The aggregated
operational losses can be seen as a sum S of a random number N of individual
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operational losses (X1, . . . , XN). This sum can be represented by:
S = X1, . . . , XN , N = 1, 2, . . . (3.1)
Three month daily statistics are taken of the time series of internal processing errors
(frequency data) and their associated severities and used in each cell of the BL/ET
matrix. Frequency refers to the number of events that occur within the specified time
period (daily buckets) T and T +τ and severity refers to the P&L impact resulting from
the frequency of events. The time (1 day bucket) period is chosen in order to ensure
that the number of data points is sufficient for statistical analysis.
3.2.1 Computing the Frequency Distribution
• Let Nij be variable in random selection, representing the number of times of
process risk event failures between times T & T + τ . Suppose subscript i refers
to the BL which ranges from 1, . . . , k and subscript j to ET (j = 1 for process
risk). We have taken a random sample implying that the observations Nij, where
i, j = (1, 1) , . . . , (k, 1) are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d). The random
variable Ni1
1 has distribution function2 (d.f.) Pi1(n/θ0), where θ0 is an unknown
parameter of the estimated distribution. The unknown parameter θ0 may be a scalar or
a vector quantity θ0, for example, The Poisson distribution depends on one parameter
called λ whereas the univariate normal distribution depends on two parameters, µ and
σ2, the mean and variance. These parameters are to be estimated in some way. We
1 Nij where subscript j = 1 since we are only dealing with 1 event type i.e. process risk
2 The term distribution function is monotonic increasing function of n which tends to 0 as n −→ −∞,
and to 1 as n −→∞
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use the Maximum Likelihood Estimate (m.l.e) which is that value of θ that makes the
observed data “most probable ”or “most likely ”. The d.f. Pi1(n/θ0), is the probability
that Ni1 takes a value less than or equal to n, where n is a small sample from the entire
population of observed frequencies, i.e.
Pij(n) = Pr (Nij ≤ n) i, j = (1, 1), . . . , (k, 1) (3.2)
The probability density function3(p.d.f) of the discrete random variable Ni1 takes
discrete values of n with finite probabilities. In the discrete case the term for p.d.f.
is the probability function (p.f.) also called the probability mass function, i.e. Ni1 is
given by the probability that the variable takes the value n, i.e.
pij(n) = Pr (Nij = n) , i, j = (1, 1), . . . , (k, 1) (3.3)
The r.h.s of equation (3.2) is the summation of the r.h.s of equation (3.3), we derive a
relation for the loss frequency distribution in terms of the (p.f):
Pij(n) =
nk∑
k=1
pij(n) i, j = (1, 1), . . . , (k, 1) (3.4)
3.2.2 Computing the Severity Distribution
• Suppose Xij is a random variable representing the amount of one loss event in a
cell of the BL/ET matrix. Define next period’s loss in each cell (i, j), where i is the
number of business line cells, LT+1i,j: Operational loss for loss type j = 1 (process
risk). One models the amount of the total operational loss of type j at a given time T
3 A density function is a non–negative function p(n) whose integral, extended over the entire x axis, is
equal to 1 for a given continuous random variable X. i.e. it is the area under the probability density curve.
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& T + 1, over the future (say 3 months), as
LT+1 =
k∑
i=1
LT+1i1 =
2∑
i=1
Ni1
T+1∑
l=1
X li1 l = 1, 2, . . . , Ni1 (3.5)
Let N1, N2, ..., Nm (where m in the number of combinations in the BL/ET matrix) be
random variables that represent the loss frequencies. It is usually assumed that the
random variables Xi1 are independently distributed and independent of the number of
events Nm. A fixed number of a particular loss type would be denoted by X
1
i1, i.e
the random variable X li1, represents random samples of the severity distribution (Aue
& Kalkbrener, 2007). The loss severity distribution is denoted by Fi1. Since loss
severity variate X is continuous (i.e. can take on any real value), we define a level
of precision h such that the probability of X being within ±h of a given number x
tends to zero. The loss severity, Xi1 has a (d.f.) Fi1(x/θ1), where θ1 is an unknown
parameter and x is a small sample from the entire population of loss severity: We
define probability density in the continuous case as follows:
fX(x) = lim
h→0
Pr[x < X ≤ x+ h]
h
= lim
h→0
FX(x+ h)− FX(x)
h
=
dFX(x)
dx
(3.6)
operate with
∫
dx on both sides of 3.6
FXij(x) =
∫ ∞
k=1
fXij(x)dx i, j = (1, 1), . . . , (k, 1) (3.7)
where fXij(x) is the probability density function (p.d.f.). Once again, the subscript X
identifies the random variable for severity (P&L impact) of one loss event while the
argument x is an arbitrary sample of the severity events.
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3.2.3 Formal Results
Having calculated both the frequency and severity process we need now to combine
them in one aggregate loss distribution that allows us to predict an amount for the
operational losses to a degree of confidence. We now introduce the aggregate loss
variable at time t given by ϑ(t). This new variable represents the loss for business
line i and event type j. The aggregate loss is defined by ϑ(t) =
∑N(t)
n=1 Xn (where X
represents individual operational losses).
• Once frequency and severity distributions are estimated, the compound loss distribu-
tion G(t) can be derived. Taking the aggregated losses we obtain:
Gϑ(t)(x) = Pr[ϑ(t) ≤ x] = Pr
N(t)∑
n=1
Xn ≤ x
 (3.8)
The derivation of an explicit formula for Gϑ(t)(x) is, in most cases impossible. Again we
implicitly assume that the processes {N(t)} and {Xn} are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d). Deriving the analytical expression for Gϑ(t)(x), we see a fundamental
relation, corroborated by Franchot et al (2001); Cruz (2002); Embrechts, Kluppelberg
& Mikosch (1997); & others given by:
Gϑ(t)(x) =

∑∞
n,k=0,1 pk(n)F
k?
X (x) x > 0
pk(0) x = 0
 (3.9)
where ? is the convolution operator on d.f.’s, Fk? is the k-fold convolution of F with
itself4, i.e. Fk?X (x) = Pr(X1 + . . . + Xk ≤ x), the d.f. of the sum of k independent
random variables with the same distribution as X.
4 the convolution of two functions f(x) and g(x) is the function∫ x
0
f(t)g(x− t)dt (3.10)
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• The aggregate loss distribution Gϑ(t)(x) cannot be represented in analytic form,
hence approximations, expansions, recursions of numerical algorithms are proposed
to overcome this problem. For purposes of our study, an approximation method will
do. One such method consists of taking a set 〈ϑ1, . . . , ϑs〉, otherwise known as the ideal
generated by elements ϑ1, . . . , ϑs which are s simulated values of the random variable
ϑij for s = 1, . . . , S (Fraleigh, 2000). This method is popularly known as Monte Carlo
simulation coined by physicists in the 1940’s, it derives its name and afore–mentioned
popularity to its similarities to games of chance. The way it works in layman’s terms
is; in place of simulating scenario’s based on a base case, any possible scenario through
the use of a probability distribution (not just a fixed value) is used to simulate a model
many times. In the LDA separate distributions of frequency and severity are derived
from loss data then combined by Monte Carlo simulation.
3.2.4 Dependence Effects (Copulae)
The standard assumption in the LDA is that frequency and severity distributions in
a cell are independent and the severity samples are i.i.d. According to Basel II,
dependence effects in OpRisk are not considered. Economic capital allocation however,
could benefit if it were determined in a way that recognises the risk-reducing impact of
correlation effects between the risks of the BL/ET combinations. Concluding remarks
from a study by Urbina & Guillen (2014) allude that failure to account for correlation
may lead to risk management practices that are unfair, as evidenced in an example
using data from the banking sector.
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One of the main issues we are confronted with in OpRisk measurement is the
aggregation of individual risks (in each BL/ET element). A powerful concept to
aggregate the risks – the copula function – has been introduced in finance by Embrechts,
McNeil & Straumann (2000). Copulas have been used extensively in finance theory
lately and are sometimes held accountable for recent global financial failures, e.g. the
global credit crunch of 2008 - 2009. They are nevertheless still applicable and in use for
OpRisk as operational risk models follow a different stochastic process to other areas
of risk, e.g. operational VaR is subject to more jumps than market VaR and is thought
to be discrete whereby market VaR is continuous.
• Copulas are functions which conveniently incorporate correlation into a function that
combines each of the frequency (marginal) distributions to produce a single bivariate
cumulative distribution function. Our model is used to determine the aggregate
(bivariate) distribution of a number of correlated random variables through the use a
Clayton copula. Dependence matters due to the effect of the addition of risk measures
over different risk classes (cells in the BL/ET matrix).
• More precisely, the frequency distributions of the individual cells of the BL/ET matrix
are correlated through a Clayton copula in order to replicate observed correlations
in the observed data. Let m be the number of cells, G1,G2, ...,Gm the distribution
functions of the frequency distributions in the individual cells and C the so–called
copula. Abe Sklar proved in 1959 through his theorem (Sklar’s Theorem) that for any
joint distribution G the copula C is unique. C is a distribution function on [0, 1]m with
uniform marginals. We refer to a recent article by Chavez–Demoulin et al (2006) for
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further information: It is sufficient to note that C is unique if the marginal distributions
are continuous.
G(x1, . . . , xm) = C (G1(x1), . . . ,Gm(xm)) (3.11)
Conversely, for any copula C and any distribution functions G1,G2, ...,Gm, the
functions C (G1(x1), . . . ,Gm(xm)) is a joint distribution function with marginals
G1(x1), . . . ,Gm(xm). Moreover, combining given marginals with a chosen copula
through Equation 3.11 always yields a multivariate distribution with those marginals.
The copula function has then a great influence on the aggregation of risk.
3.3 Population and Sample
3.3.1 Population
Annex 2 of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) identifies the main activities of a
FI along three standard business units: Investment Banking (IB), Banking & Other which are
further subdivided into eight levels: Corporate Finance, Trading and Sales, Retail Banking,
Commercial Banking, Payment and Settlement, Retail Brokerage, Asset Management, and
Agency Services. Furthermore, potential losses resulting from a bank’s operational events
are decomposed into a number of sub risks using business lines and risk categories defined
by the bank. According to the Basel Committee (2001), there are generally seven loss
event type categories: Internal Fraud, External Fraud, Employment Practices and Workplace
Safety, Business Disruption and System failures, Execution, Delivery & Process Management,
Clients, Products and Business Practices, and Damage to Physical Assets. Accordingly,
banks must estimate VaR for each of the business lines per event type combinations, this
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works out to 7×8 = 56 risk types. Table 3.1 illustrates the formation of a 7×3 = 21, BL/ET
matrix.
Event Type Category [Xi, Xj] Business Lines
IB Banking Other FIRM
Internal Fraud ET1 1 2 3 AG1
External Fraud ET2 4 5 6 AG2
Damage ET3 7 8 9 AG3
Business Disruption ET4 10 11 12 AG4
Clients, products,.. ET5 13 14 15 AG5
Execution, delivery,.. ET6 16 17 18 AG6
Employment practices.. ET7 19 20 21 AG7
Tab. 3.1: The BL/ET Matrix for 7 event types and 3 business lines
3.3.2 Sample and Sampling method
Sample
In the study, the bank under consideration consists of an organisational structure unique to
itself; nevertheless the business line split from our sample is structured to align as closely as
possible to the standard adopted by the Basel approach. Our sample consists of two business
lines and one event type category. The two are: i = 1, Banking BL1, & i = 2, Trading
BL2 and the j = 1, Process Risk ET1: The Execution, Delivery & Process Management
category of OpRisk. Historical losses arising from failed transaction processing or process
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management, from relations with trade counterparties and vendors which give rise to process
risk at the bank in question have been identified for the period beginning 02 January, 2013
to 20 March, 2013.
Table 3.2 below demonstrates the two way business line split per one row event type matrix
to be adopted. Each process risk event is linked to a unique trade reference or trade number:
Each unique trade number is classified under either one of the two business lines forming
the BL/ET matrix, i.e. if a trade falls under the Banking business line it cannot fall under
the Trading business line and vice versa. A consistent data set is guaranteed by reference
to the trade field entry which specifies it’s business line BLi. Trades are unique, and so
are the numbers that reference them. This way repetition of trades is avoided which serves
to eliminate repetition of process risk loss across cells. Permission to conduct the study
Internal Event Type [Xi, Xj] Business Lines
Banking Trading FIRM
Process risk ET1 1 2 AG
Tab. 3.2: The BL/ET Matrix for a South African Investment Bank:
was sought and granted by the legal, compliance and risk management authorities at the
bank in question. Data for frequency of losses attributed to process risk operational errors
is obtained from the ATAT database, the loss data is internally generated and reflects the
investment banks loss profile for processing errors most accurately.
Completeness of data capture is ensured due to the trade by trade nature of reporting of
operational fallouts, which is essential for frequency calibration. Severity loss data associated
with the frequency loss data is obtained to coincide with the period noted. Furthermore,
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the frequency and severity datasets coincide, hence the losses suffered through operational
fallouts are specific to the trade level events that led to the losses, hence to process risk
events exclusively. It must follow that sub-samples of the two distributions, i.e. frequency
and severity distribution samples can be generated for the entire population.
Sampling method
Figure 3.1 is a snapshot of a blotter for vanilla interest rate derivatives, matched trades
are confirmed and trades with mismatching details require amending prior to confirmation.
When a deal is agreed, e.g. a fixed income trader agrees to buy a 4yr, ZAR100 million
interest rate swap at a rate of 7.98% (TRD#5 in blotter Figure 3.1) between his bank and
a counterparty fixed income dealer at another bank, B, a trade blotter is received and the
captured trade details are compared to the details on the blotter.
The post trade booking service continues throughout the life of each deal. If one follows
the chain of processing events (refer to Figure 1.1), the trader will then book the deal by
capturing it in the FO system, it is checked for accuracy by MO and then confirmed against
a deal confirmation, which is also agreed to by BO. The deal is now captured within the
relevant portfolio in the bank’s FO/treasury system. The treasury system is the control
framework which enables this process to flow seamlessly. The control unit is reliant on
a myriad systems (of which the treasury system is a part) controlling the reporting and
processing function within an organisation. It is up to each bank’s control unit to choose
an automated, information technology solution that is appropriate for its specific purpose.
This is extremely important as automation serves as the key to a fast, reliable and accurate
trading service.
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Fig. 3.1: Sample of a blotter template for trading in fixed income securities
Trade amendments consist of putting in manual adjustments to trade details in the trade
ticket when necessary. Many times these adjustments are due a manual update, such as
correcting for an incorrectly booked rate, e.g. suppose the 4yr swap was incorrectly booked
at rate of 7.988% in the FO system when it should have been 7.98% (as reflected in the
blotter). If this so happens, an instruction is given and the trade ticket will be amended to
reflect the correct rate (of 7.98%). The amendments to details are compiled in a report at
the end of the month for statistical purposes and are used as a source of KRI’s.
3.4 The Research Instrument
As mentioned previously, the ATAT database will be used to collect data. The ATAT is an
innovative new development used as a vital internal control tool providing an electronic
solution to the management of the amendment function. As mentioned before, the
transaction flow starts at the FO system which registers the transaction. The success of
the tool is in its ability to automate data collection directly from the FO/treasury system
where the transaction is registered, the ATAT works like a filter, collecting every cancellation,
and/or amendment made to a transaction. The filter will highlight the OpRisk loss event
eliminating the reliance on individuals to account for cancellations or amendments made to a
transaction by printing out emails and keeping a manually updated record of events. As part
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Fig. 3.2: Design of a data filter for an automated trade amendment tracker (ATAT)
of its functionality, users are able to subscribe to a controlled list of reasons for amendments,
ensuring explanations around amendments are clear and easily analysed.
A typical design of a filter is shown in Figure 3.2. Data quality of loss reporting is often a
major concern in many organisations. The ATAT simplifies data collection for loss reporting
by ensuring that the following processes are built-in to workflow capabilities:
• Daily
1. Each amendment in the ATAT is reviewed and the event type and business line
fields are populated
2. All supporting documentation is properly referenced to the tracker and filed in a
dedicated amendment file
• Monthly
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1. Extract, print and review all amends and ensure support file is complete
2. Provide the detail to the desk head of the business line and obtain physical sign
off to evidence his/her review.
Displayed in Appendix C.1 is an example of what a ATAT might look like. A trade level view
of pre–populated descriptive elements of trade details captured in tailor made organisational
fields are pictured in the amendment loss database form. In the snapshot users are able to
obtain a list of information to serve as a guideline of the nature of the amendment made
to each and every trade by the business line desk, and then to enrich this data with a user
defined description of why the amendment was required. There are certain standard entries
which cannot be tampered with as they are hard coded in, a hard coded entry field is one
such as the person who amended the trade, or in which business line the trade belongs.
There are mandatory fields, additional fields which can be edited/updated and require no
programming. These fields are where the person responsible for updating the field categorises
the reasons for the amendment (operational event type), responsible persons and the nature
of the trade amendment, i.e. rate, nominal, etc. A guideline is provided which is designed to
give the user a step by step procedure to deduce the nature of the amendment as tabulated
and displayed in the embedded view (in the bottom left corner) labeled “Amendment Detail”.
3.5 Procedure for data collection
In this study, time series of internal frequency and severity data was obtained on request
from a South African bank. A letter of motivation was provided in support of the data
request, (Appendix C.2) following which confidentiality agreements (NDAs) needed to be
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signed and final approval issued from the bank to ensure protocol was complied with. The
researcher, assisted by volunteers in the Corporate and Investment Banking Wealth Middle
Office (CIBW MO) team, prepared the data on specific days when he was present at the
investment bank. Their cooperation was requested and promised. The complete set of
data was handed to the researcher for data analysis, who also undertook not to cause any
disruption to functions of the bank.
Confidentiality of client information was maintained, no names were disclosed in the research
report. The bank in question will be provided with the research report from the researcher
who would supply such a report.
The following steps/protocol needed to be followed:
1. Confidentiality Agreement signed (NDAs)
2. Data to be prepared by CIBW MO
a. Request criteria to be defined e.g. period/type etc.
b. Client names removed
3. Final product signoff
a. No inference to be drawn from research of the bank in question
i. Reference made to a South African bank
b. The research paper should be submitted to Legal and Compliance prior to being
released
Chapter 4
RESULTS
4.1 Data Analysis and Interpretation
We model the loss distribution in each cell in the BL/ET matrix through implementation
of a high performing simulation based computer software package which uses calibration
and simulation algorithms for a range of distributions in order to determine the appropriate
distribution class for a particular cell. This package which specialises in quantitative risk
analysis is an excel tool called ModelRisk from Vose Software BVBA.
ModelRisk was first released in the mid–2000s. The most recent version is a comprehensive
Monte Carlo simulation tool that contains a number of advanced and unique capabilities and
techniques. It was created by David Vose; he provided guidance on the use of ModelRisk and
played a key role in conducting the risk analysis in this research paper. For more information
on ModelRisk visit www.vosesoftware.com. Figure 4.1 is a snapshot of the ModelRisk Add-
in. It contains a number of consistent features with excel, which makes it particularly useful
in estimating OpRisk VaR. Excel is the medium of choice due to its applicability to the
analysis.
We present cross–sectional data from a study of 369 process risk losses and accompanying
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Fig. 4.1: The ModelRisk toolbar with choices of consistent features in excel
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P&L per event impact of each loss amounting to R 61 534 745 over a period of three months
(January 2013 - March 2013). Figure 4.2 is a scatterplot of the empirical dataset (number of
loss events vs single event P&L loss impact) which provides a convenient summary showing
the wide range of losses. On examination of the scatterplot we find no indication of any
particular trend between the two variables. The loss values are depicted as positive in the
scatter plot. The data has not been adjusted for inflation over this period. Our task was to
estimate the 1 – day 99.9% OpRisk VaR for process risk in the South African (ZA) Bank.
4.1.1 Fitting Distributions to Data
Apart from generated scenarios LDA models rely on loss data and are inherently backward
looking. It is therefore important as a fist step, to fit distributions to the historically observed
losses and then simulate what the losses might look like over the specific time interval. On
the ModelRisk toolbar, under the drop down menu on the “Fit ”tab, shown in Figure 4.1,
choose “Fit Distribution ”and follow the commands.
Once again, David Vose’s experience and skill assisted in selecting appropriate distribution
classes to test against, i.e. displaying the severity loss data in descending order (from high
P&L impact to low) which optimises ModelRisk’s data handling capabilities. Zero P&L
impact entries have been excluded from the data to be tested hence have no effect in the
resulting fit. Estimates of best fit distributions for the separate frequency and severity data
elements are obtained and the optimal fits listed below.
1. Frequency distribution
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• The Geometric distribution
G : p, p = 0.4179105
is the optimal fitting discrete distribution for the Banking BL according to SIC.
• The Polya distribution
Polya : (α, β), α = 6.557774, β = 0.7924074
is the optimal fitting discrete distribution for the Trading BL according to SIC.
2. Severity distribution
• The Lognormal distribution
Lognormal(µ1, σ1), µ1 = 411736.7, σ1 = 2271727
is the optimal fitting continuous distribution for the Banking BL according to
SIC.
• The Lognormal distribution
Lognormal(µ2, σ2), µ2 = 1043960, σ2 = 6121955
is the optimal fitting continuous distribution for the Trading BL according to SIC.
4.1.2 Information criterion
Since it is not obvious by visual inspection which parametric combinations (p, α, β, µ1, µ2, σ1,
and σ2) to use, they are compared to goodness-of-fit tests/statistics. According to Lehman,
Groenendaal, & Nolder (2012), ModelRisk will fit each appropriate distribution to the
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data and compute several values, called information criterion, to describe how well the
distribution fit, fits the data. There are several information criterion available to determine
the estimated distributions. They are the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz
Bayes Information Criterion (SIC) and the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQIC).
They consist of computed values based on estimating the likelihood that the observed data
could have come from each postulated distribution. For example the AIC is defined as:
AIC = −2l
Y
+
2
Y
× (number of parameters) (4.1)
where the likelihood is evaluated at the m.l.e and Y is the sample size, i.e.
l = log(likelihood)
= −Y
2
(1 + log2pi) + log(
´ˆeeˆ
Y
)
(4.2)
One computes the AIC(k), k = 1, 2, . . . , p and selects the one with the maximum value.
Higher numbers (lower absolute numbers if they are negative) indicate better fitting
distributions. This is borne out by Appendix A.5: Different distributions ranked according
to SIC1are observed in the snapshot of computed values of the SIC, AIC, and HQIC showing
the optimal fit at the top. All fits are performed parameters estimated by (m.l.e) methods.
In the current environment the selection of a copula function for modeling frequency
correlations, is enabled by ModelRisk’s “Fit ”function followed by the “Bivariate Fit Copula
1 The SIC is an alternative to the AIC that imposes a larger penalty for additional coefficients
SIC = −2l
T
+
(klogT )
T
, k = 1, 2, . . . , p (4.3)
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”. More precisely, the frequency distributions of the individual cells are correlated through
a copula - VoseSoftware picks the technique from each approach depending on how they fit
our problem and how easy they are to implement. Based on statistical tests (information
criterion) ModelRisk determines the Clayton copula estimate.
4.1.3 Goodness–of–fit tests
The histogram of the results are shown in Appendices A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4 along with
the visual representation of the goodness–of–fit plots. These are visual tests which offer an
intuitive way of comparing the data and the fitted distributions.
• Overlaying a histogram plot of the data with a density function is perhaps the most
informative comparison as it’s easier to see that the general shape of the data compares
relatively well given the very few x values.
• An overlay of the cumulative frequency plots of the data and the fitted distribution
provides a summary of the variability of measurements. The common S–shape curves
will only show large differences between the data and fitted distributions.
• Probability–probability (P–P) plot: A plot of the cumulative distribution of the fitted
curve F (x) against the cumulative frequency Fn(x) = i/(n+ 1) for all values of xi for
a sample of size n . If the underlying fitted distribution is derived from the theoretical
distribution, the plot should look roughly linear.
• Quantile–quantile plot: A plot of the observed data xi against the x values where
F (x) = Fn(x), i.e. = i/(n+ 1).
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4.1.4 Further manipulation of data
The next step is to reproduce the basic data by generating Monte Carlo simulated values
from the estimated distributions of the fitted data of observed losses. Figure 4.3 & Figure
4.4 are the resulting histogram and line plot of one million iterations of MC simulated loss
values.
Seen in the result displayed in Figure 4.3 is a graphical overlay representation of both the
banking and trading frequency loss data. As can be seen from Figure 4.3, the histograms
depict the discrete nature of frequency data. By visual inspection, one can see from the
overlay chart that the two histograms appear to come from separate distribution classes.
Likewise, Figure 4.4 is a graphical overlay representation of the severity loss data. As can
be seen through the naked eye these line graphs appear to be somewhat similar; i.e. they
appear to come from the same distribution class, i.e. we think of the simulated data as
random samples from an underlying process (which follows the Lognormal distribution),
with somewhat different parameters based on a different set of random values. In both
cases the sets of random samples came from the same underlying process, but the fitted
distribution for each set will produce different parameters for the Lognormal distribution.
The line graphs capture the continuous nature of the severity data; the aggregate loss model
is characterized by the differing compositions of the frequency and severity data.
4.1.5 Distribution Fitting for VaR
Whereas the previous steps dealt with the data sources that are used in the modeling process,
the next step is devoted to the specification of the LDA model. The LDA involves the
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Fig. 4.3: Overlay histogram of the frequency (number of times) of process risk loss events in a ZA
bank: 02 January, 2013 – 20 March, 2013
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Fig. 4.4: Overlay Line Graph of the severity (single event P&L impact) of process risk loss events
in a ZA bank: 02 January 2013 - 20 March 2013
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analysis of multiple distributions of event frequency (correlated through a Clayton copula)
and severity at the same time. The spreadsheet displayed in Appendix C.3 shows the
excel model for the LDA. In this model we feature the Aggregate Multi Monte Carlo tool
“VoseAggregateMultiMC ”found under ModelRisk’s “Aggregate ”menu which conducts a
true simulation “behind the scenes ”to generate a sum (aggregate) of several frequency and
severity distributions simultaneously. There are three general steps for implementing MC
simulation:
1. Build a Monte Carlo model in excel
2. Run a Monte Carlo simulation for a large number of iterations
• Sample from frequency distribution to determine the number of loss events (= N)
• Sample N times from the loss severity distribution to determine the loss severity
for each loss event
• Sum loss severities to determine total loss
3. Review and present the results of the Monte Carlo simulation.
Aggregating the estimated frequency distributions and estimated severity distributions
simulated through one million iterations by Monte Carlo gives the output aggregate loss
distribution shown in Figure 4.5; i.e. the correlated frequency distributions – the Geo-
metric(0.4179105) and Polya(6.557774,0.7924074), and corresponding severity distributions
modeled as Lognormal(411736,2271724) and Lognormal(1043960,6121955). The random
value drawn from this estimate made up of the sum of individual losses provides one estimate
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of a potential aggregate operational loss to the bank and becomes one data point of the loss
distribution.
4.1.6 The Generalised Extreme Value Distribution
Since the aggregate loss at any moment is a continuous random variable, it follows that the
loss over the next period is also a continuous random variable. In OpRisk we attempt to
model not only the entire range a variable might take, but also to withstand the highest
loss (extreme loss). Modeling the extremes of loss events makes sense since these make the
greatest impact (e.g. losses due to “rogue trader’s ”). People have put a lot of effort into
determining the distributions of extremes to model data that is extreme and rare.
Since we are interested in loss values that determine whether a system will potentially fail, we
undertake one million iterations of the resulting aggregate loss distribution as per Figure 4.5,
by generating MC simulations through the excel model Model–Process–Risk.xlsx (Appendix
C.3). The resulting dataset consisting of one million entries represents the total aggregate
loss output probability distribution the simulation is trying to achieve. This is now estimated
to the output aggregate loss probability distribution (using the “Fit ”function choose “Fit
Distribution ”and follow the prompts in ModelRisk) as before (Section 4.1.1).
Figure 4.6 is a histogram of the output aggregate loss distribution of a million random
aggregate loss samples of process risk in the ZA bank. ModelRisk provides the use of the
Generalised Extreme Value distribution: GEV(a,b,c) as an adequate fit for the operational
loss data set using the single best fitting set of parameters; a = 1917993, b = 2329948, c =
0.8124032.
The GEV(a,b,c) distribution is a continuous probability distribution developed in the theory
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behind determining extreme value distributions. Accordingly, the distribution of extreme
values for large samples is given by one of three distributions that form the special cases
of the GEV distribution, i.e. the GEV distribution is equivalent to a Gumbel, Frechet or
Weibull distribution dependent on whether c = 0, c > 0, or c < 0 respectively.
ModelRisk has estimated the parameters of this function that best fit the data. As a summary
of these losses, descriptive statistics are presented in Table B.2, and the visual representation
in goodness–of–fit plots labeled Figures 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 respectively.
The standardised d.f. of the GEV distribution is written as:
Ha,b,c(x) = exp
[
−
[
1 + c
(
x− a
b
)]− 1
c
]
(4.4)
where a, b, and c are location, scale and shape parameters. Expressions of equations are
shown below along with the boundary conditions that satisfy them.
Ha,b,c(x) =

exp
[
− exp
(
x−a
b
)]
if −∞ < x < +∞, −∞ < a < +∞, c = 0
exp
[
−
(
x−a
b
)−c ]
if x ≥ a, b > 0 c > 0
exp
[
−
(
a−x
b
)c ]
if x ≤ a, b > 0 c > 0

(4.5)
The GEV(a,b,c) contains the Frechet distribution as a special case (i.e. when c > 0). To
generate a Frechet distribution, notice that the c.d.f for the Frechet is given by;
Ha,b,c(x) = exp
[
−
(
x− a
b
)−c ]
if x ≥ a, b > 0 c > 0 (4.6)
H(x) is a uniform random variable, so inverting the equation we get
x = b
(
1
− lnU(0, 1)
) 1
c
+ a (4.7)
so we use this equation to generate the Frechet distribution.
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Comparison of probability density
It can be seen from Figure 4.7 that the estimated GEV (a, b, c) line graph compares well with
the input distribution histogram (probability density), i.e. it covers both the initial data and
the tails. However from visual inspection alone, we cannot determine if the fit is adequate
or not.
Comparison of cumulative probability distributions
Figure 4.8 is a comparison of the cumulative probability distributions (c.d.f) of the input
distribution and the estimated GEV(a,b,c) distribution. Again, from visual inspection the
plot does not show very large differences between data and the GEV(a,b,c) distribution.
This graph conveniently summarizes the variability in aggregate operational risk losses. For
example, we can see from the graph that about 90% of the samples had losses less than
R16.9 million and about 10% had losses less than an amount of R500 000.
P–P & Q–Q plots
Figure 4.9 is a probability–probability (P–P) plot comparison of the input distribution and
the estimated GEV (a, b, c) distribution, and Figure 4.10 is a quantile – quantile (Q–Q) plot
showing the quantiles of the internal process risk losses on the x–axis and the quantiles of
a million aggregate loss sample scenarios on the y–axis. The P–P plot and Q–Q plot both
indicate better fits, the closer they resemble a straight line. The plots are less sensitive to
discrepancies in fit than the comparison of probability density plot, however they each have
their uses. The P–P graph in Figure 4.9 clearly shows a linear relationship with no indication
of any deviation of the fitted distribution to the theoretical one. It is close to the ideal
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Fig. 4.7: Comparison of probability density of Monte Carlo simulations of aggregate loss data to
the GEV (a, b, c) distribution, where a = 1917993, b = 2329948, c = 0.8124032
straight line indicating a good fit. The Q–Q graph, Figure 4.10 shows a clear deviation from
linearity; note that in the left tail of the plotted distribution the observations are collinear
but as the x–axis values increase the y–axis values are bigger than expected, i.e. the right
tails of the distribution increase more quickly (are “heavier ”). From an examination of
Figure 4.10 we see a concave departure from the ideal linear shape. This indicates a heavier
tailed distribution whereas convexity would indicate a shorter tailed distribution.
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Fig. 4.8: Comparison of cumulative probability distributions of Monte Carlo simulations of
aggregate loss data to the GEV(a,b,c) distribution, where a = 1917993, b = 2329948, c =
0.8124032
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Fig. 4.9: Probability-probability plot comparison between Monte Carlo simulations of aggregate
loss data and the GEV(a,b,c) distribution, where a = 1917993, b = 2329948, c = 0.8124032
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Fig. 4.10: Quantile-quantile plot comparison between Monte Carlo simulations of aggregate loss
data and the GEV(a,b,c) distribution, where a = 1917993, b = 2329948, c = 0.8124032
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4.1.7 VaR Analysis
Among many other tools, ModelRisk has a highly technical, powerful and unique approach
to extreme-value modeling, making it possible to calculate directly the probability that the
largest of a million claims following a certain distribution will not exceed some value X with
some defined degree of confidence. The question being asked: “What loss level is such that
we are 100%(1−α) confident it will not be exceeded in t business days?”. We complete a VaR
analysis at this stage using the GEV(a,b,c) where a = 1917993, b = 2329948, c = 0.8124032.
To complete the VaR estimation, recall that once a static distribution has been fit to the
data, we can compute the 99th percentile of the histogram 4.6 for the corresponding loss
amount calibrated on the x-axis, i.e., 1% of the time, over the next three months the
bank will not exceed a loss greater than the x–axis value (viz., R118 329 510 as
depicted in the figure2).
Our risk measure will be based on a 3 – month (quarter–of–a–year) time horizon, which
is then divided by
√
(no. of business days) to compute the daily VaR. We calculate the
VaR from a defined 100%(1-α) quantile, e.g. 99th percentile (α = 0.01 ) left–tail confidence
interval, i.e. that a 1 in 100th quarter–of–a–year event might occur. For convenience we have
simulated the 95th, 99th, and 99.9th percentiles and placed them in the model spreadsheet as
seen in Appendix C.4 (using the ModelRisk function “VoseSimPercentile ”). The results are
depicted below
2 The x amount in the figure (R120 000 000) is rounded up to the next 10th of a million
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1–day VaR from Static GEV(a,b,c) for 99.9th percentile
V aRα=0.001 =
R773 938 918√
(56)days
= R103 421 938 (4.8)
1–day VaR from Static GEV(a,b,c) for 99th percentile
V aRα=0.01 =
R118 329 510√
(56)days
= R15 812 446 (4.9)
1–day VaR from Static GEV(a,b,c) for 95th percentile
V aRα=0.05 =
R30 908 206√
(56)days
= R4 130 283 (4.10)
The VaR estimates decrease when the confidence interval is increased. Under Basel II, RC
for OpRisk is based on a 1–year 99.9% VaR, while the confidence level consistent with EC
is 99.95% or higher, e.g., VaR for economic capital:
R190 216 975×
√
(252 business days) = R3 019 600 866
The standard procedure for operational risk is to specify the economic capital as VaR - Expected Loss,
i.e.,
R3.02billion - Expected Loss = Economic Capital.
Chapter 5
DISCUSSION
The LDA method of AMA analysis is a fitting means of calculating the OpRisk VaR measure
and the ATAT is an efficient tool used to provide sufficient internal data as it most accurately
reflects internal process risk loss events. The results indicate that the GEV(1917993, 2329948,
0.8124032) maximises the SIC, suggesting that it is the most appropriate model and provides
the most adequate fit. Furthermore, the special case (where c > 0) would provide a better
estimate for VaR - providing an answer to the simple question: “How bad can things get?”.
5.1 Limitations of the Study
During the peak of the financial crisis, there were numerous examples of banks providing
inaccurate information to regulators. Regulators need to do more to encourage institutions to
share their loss data. Aggregation of high quality data from several sources is a prerequisite
if sound risk management is to be implemented within a bank or FI.
The LDA would be a successful tool but has not quite managed to be regarded as one.
Historically, sources of OpRisk loss data are few and of low quality – the introduction of
the ATAT is the key in our experimentation. It would be difficult to implement the LDA
where data is scarce and of low quality, and where a wealth of data exists, such as where
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you have a data consortium - for example the Operational RiskData eXchange Association
(ORX) - which is clearly quantitative in that there are lots of different losses by the region,
the product line information, the event type and the actual loss amount, bank loss data is
anonymised before it is sent out, so there is very little information about the context of why
the loss occurred and where the information came from.
5.2 Validity and Reliability
Regulators have been slow to realise the importance of effective IT systems. The ATAT data
gathering technique attempts to address the gap experienced where FI’s cannot prove loss
data is flowing with a high degree of accuracy. It attempts to address a key lesson from
the financial crisis - that banks’, which rely on spreadsheets and manual controls to pull
numbers together, are inadequate to support the broad management of financial risks. The
OpRisk database (the ATAT) consists of modeled data at transaction level instead of being
aggregated on a daily or monthly level. This way, the ATAT is capable of employing a more
advanced technique of modeling the levels of risk. In June 2012, for the first time in banking
regulation, the Basel Committee released a paper set out to put explicit requirements for
accuracy, completeness and timeliness of risk reporting. The paper titled “Principles of
Effective Risk Data Aggregation and Risk Reporting ”paves the way for data integrity to
drive the quality of decision making. The ATAT automates data validation and reliability for
reduced costs and risks, while living by the principles set in the documentation of the paper.
The process risk data consists of 369 losses over sixty million rand from January 2013 to
March 2013, unadjusted for inflation. This period is when the loss events were recorded
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through the ATAT database, hence were actual losses in real time. The dataset contains a
wide range of losses with a minimum being R1 102 and the maximum being R8 752 614. The
losses are posted at the most granular level (on a trade by trade basis) then aggregated on a
daily level, this further indicates the wide range of losses hence the elimination of bias and
non–representativeness. The ATAT is instrumental due to its ability to collect data at the
most granular level. The data also comes with supporting documentation and commentary
provided by end users and can therefore be traced back to uncover root causes. The data
can be analysed in various formats, such as in excel, define follow up action items with
due dates, and assign responsible persons for those items not yet explained by the user,
providing business continuity with the benefit of an electronic solution to the management
of amendments.
Figure 5.1 is a pivot chart (histogram) constructed from the input data observed in the
attached excel table labeled ”Input Data” in Appendix C.4. The proportion of amendments
to terminations for the given period are shown and analysed. Further analysis is portrayed in
Figure 5.2: Pivoted data is extracted from a source file in excel; a sample consisting of original
root causes from the ATAT database is displayed. It consists of documented trade amendment
details on a trade by trade basis extracted from the ATAT into excel for amendments done
to trades on the 19 March, 2013. The granularity of the data is owed to the unique trade
identifier (Trade field), which comes with other additional fields useful in root cause analysis.
For example, “Dealer B ”may have been responsible for most processing errors on this day,
notably due to the reason “client request to amend economics of deal ”resulting in the loss
of R8 752 614. At the level of individual loss events it is fundamental that the bank knows
when they happened, be able to identify the root causes of losses arising from operational
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Fig. 5.1: Histogram of frequencies of loss events for amended vs terminated deals
Fig. 5.2: Pivoted data of frequencies of loss events per associated severity for amended deals done
on 19 March, 2013
events and attribute the losses appropriately. In addition, there are intrinsic benefits to
managing OpRisk, as it maximises the certainty of meeting business objectives.
5.3 Conclusion
• OpRisk modeling is based on two underlying processes, the frequency and the severity
of losses. The LDA model, which estimates the shape of the frequency of loss events and
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the severity of individual events, provides a realistic measure of OpRisk VaR provided
the input data is reliable. This measure of OpRisk VaR is used to determine economic
capital for the bank in question. A bank’s internal operations are unique to the bank,
hence employing the ATAT in targeting their risk measure goes a long way in addressing
their competitiveness as it opens up more decision making options which in turn may
raise the banks’ investability.
• The investment banking environment is an action orientated industry where those
whose skills and experience are highly treasured (and likewise remunerated) whose
decisive thinking and seasoned judgement very often materialises into profits. The
ATAT through the LDA not only allows for an action orientated risk unit which can
quickly communicate risk events, but can also quantify an important aspect of risk in
a single number – VaR.
• It can be seen that the GEV(a,b,c) distribution, maximises the SIC, suggesting that
it is the most appropriate model for the aggregate loss distribution for process risk.
From visual inspection and the goodness of fit test, it would seem that the GEV(a,b,c)
distribution; a = 1917993, b = 2329948, c = 0.8124032, does provide an adequate fit
to the data, i.e., it covers both the initial loss data and the tails. The P–P plot
closely resembles a straight line which indicates that the GEV(a,b,c) distribution
assumption is an appropriate one. The Q–Q plot has a general departure from
the fourth quartile which suggests that the loss dataset would be a heavier tailed
distribution. This is consistent with the theory behind extreme value modeling and
suggests that operational risk data can be modeled as such.
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• Previous studies have focused the use of extreme value modeling in a wide variety
of applications due to its ability to model data that is extreme in severity as well
as rare. They did this in a manner which would benefit from a distribution that
overestimates rather than underestimates the capital adequacy requirement, as it would
be better to have excess capital provisions in the event of a catastrophic loss. More
specifically, previous practitioners had to look externally for good quality datasets as
data was rare and of low quality, and even then, they had to determine thresholds or
optimal cut off points, where data would be truncated. The mathematical reasons why
optimal threshold selection is very difficult is best appreciated by Chavez–Demoulin et
al (2006). I am improving on this by virtue of the use of an automated data gathering
technique, in the form of the ATAT device; supporting the logic pointed out by Zhaoyang
(2013), that recent advances in risk analysis and management should be able to better
distinguish the “bads ”from the “goods ”in the discussion of OpRisk measurement,
which eliminates the reliance on external loss databases and professional guesses. The
ATAT dataset comes from an automated feed therefore has arguably higher reliability
and is more complete. This argument is evidenced through the consistent findings for
loss distributions in this study and those found in theory.
5.4 Future Research
This study has demonstrated how an automated device (the ATAT), in conjunction with
the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA) as a measurement method for operational risk,
can be used to determine VaR with a high degree of certainty, which in turn determines
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the amount of capital needed to absorb unexpected losses. What we haven’t done is to
determine the exact meaning of “high degree of certainty”, in fact, it differs as it depends
on the individual risk tolerance of each bank. It is obvious that this problem becomes
particularly challenging for OpRisk and is one of the reasons why internal data needs to
be supplemented by external data (hence the inclusion of the term “external events ”in the
definition of OpRisk). Practically, it means an appropriate mix between internal and external
data must be imposed, in order to enhance statistical efficiency. This process will almost
surely benefit from experienced professionals in the qualitative area of OpRisk, stressing
a crucial element: Quantitative measures of fit cannot substitute for the use of
judgment in modeling.
The benefits of future research in the suggested area would be the determination of an
optimal mix of internal and external data as the current Basel Committee document does
not provide any solution to this issue.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aue, F., & Kalkbrener, M.(2001). “LDA at work: Deutsche bank’s approach to quantifying
operational risk”. Journal of Operational Risk 1(4), 49-93.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.(2001)“Operational risk”. Basel: Bank fo
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2001, 4 May). “QIS 2 - Operational risk loss
data”Retrieved 09 January, 2014, from http://www.bis.org/bcbs/qisoprisknote.pdf
r International Settlements.
Chartis Research Ltd.(2013, 8 July). “Operational risk management systems for
financial services 2013: Thomson Reuters vendor highlights”Retrieved 14 Jan-
uary, 2014, from urlhttp://www.risklibrary.net/download/chartis-report-operational-risk-
management-systems-financial-services-2013-17676
Chavez–Demoulin, V., Embrechts, P., & Neslehova, J.(2006). “Quantitative models for
operational risk: Extremes, dependence and aggregation”. Journal of Banking & Finance
30(10), 2635-2658.
Chavez–Demoulin, V., Embrechts, P., & Neslehova, J.(2006). “Quantitative models for
operational risk: Extremes, dependence and aggregation”. Journal of Banking & Finance
30(10), 2635-2658.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 79
CheckPoint Technologies (2011, 25 November 2011). “How to effectively manage operational
risk: For Basel II, Solvency II and arrow Retrieved 9 February 2013, 2011 from
http://www.checkpoint.com/grc/downloads/whitepapers/wp-manage-oper-risk.pdf
Cruz, M.(2002). “Modeling, measuring and hedging operational risk”. (First ed.).West
Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Cruz, M.,Coleman, R., & Salkin, G.(1998). “Modelling and measuring operational risk”.
Journal of Risk 1(4), 63-72.
Cummings, D., Christopher, M., & Ran, W.(2006). “The market value loss of operational
loss events for US bankers and insurers”. Journal of Banking and Finance 30, 2605-2634.
Cummings, D., Christopher, M., & Ran, W.(2006). “The market value loss of operational
loss events for US bankers and insurers”. Journal of Banking and Finance 30, 2605-2634.
Embrechts, P., Kluppelberg, C.,& Mikosch, T. “Modelling extremal events for insurance and
finance”. Berlin: Springer.
Embrechts, P.,McNeil, A.,& Straumann, D.(2000). “Correlation and dependency in risk
management: properties and pitfalls ”. Great Britain: Cambridge University Press.
Eun, C., Reswick, B., & Sabwerhal, S.(2012). “International Financial Management”. (Sixth
ed.).New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Feller, W.(1950). “An introduction to probability theory and its applications”. (Third
ed.).New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 80
Frachot, A., Georges, P., & Roncalli, T.(2001). “Loss distribution approach for operational
risk”. Journal of Operational Risk 2(4), 103-109.
Frachot, A., Georges, P., & Roncalli, T.(2001). “Loss distribution approach for operational
risk”. Journal of Operational Risk 2(4), 103-109.
Fraleigh, J.(2000). “A first course in abstract algebra”. (Sixth ed.).Massachusetts: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.
Hull, J.(2012). “Risk management and financial institutions”. (Third ed.).New Jersey: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc.
King, J.(2001). “Operational risk: measuring and modelling”. West Sussex: John Wiley &
Sons, Ltd.
King, M.(1999). “Back office and beyond: A guide to procedures, settlements and risk in
financial markets”. (Second ed.).Great Britain: Gilmour Drummond Publishing.
Klugman, S., Panjer, H., & Willmot, G.(2004). “Loss models: from data to decisions”.
(Second ed.).New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
KPMG International Cooperative. (2014, 13 January). “Developing a strong risk
management framework – challenges and solutions”Retrieved 14 January, 2014,
from urlhttp://www.risklibrary.net/download/developing-strong-risk-appetite-program-
challenges-solutions-19609
Lehman, D., Groenendaal, H., & Nolder, G.(2012). “Practical spreadsheet risk modeling for
management”. (First ed.).Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 81
ORX(2012). “2012 ORX report on operational risk loss data”. Operational Riskdata
eXchange, Zurich.
Panjer, H.(2006). “Operational risk: modeling analytics”. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc.
Urbina, J., & Guillen, M.(2014). “An application of capital allocation principles to operational
risk and the cost of fraud”. Journal of Banking & Finance 41(16), 7023-7031.
Zhaoyang, L.(2013). “Measuring the capital charge for operational risk of a bank with the
large deviation approach”. Mathematical and Computer Modelling 58(9–10), 1634-1647.
Appendices
82
Appendix A
GOODNESS–OF–FIT PLOTS AND STATISTICS
Appendix A. Goodness–Of–Fit Plots and Statistics 84
A.1 Fitting a Discrete Parametric Distribution to BBL Loss Data:
Geometric Variate G : p, p = 0.4179105
Fig. A.1: (a) Overlay of a histogram plot of the data with a density function of the fitted
distribution. (b) Overlay of the cumulative frequency plots of the data and the fitted
distribution. (c)(P–P) plot (d) (Q–Q) plot.
Appendix A. Goodness–Of–Fit Plots and Statistics 85
A.2 Fitting a Discrete Parametric Distribution to TBL Loss Data: Polya
Variate Polya(α, β), α = 6.557774, β = 0.7924074
Fig. A.2: Overlay of a histogram plot of the data with a density function of the fitted distribution.
(b) Overlay of the cumulative frequency plots of the data and the fitted distribution.
(c)(P–P) plot (d) (Q–Q) plot.
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A.3 Fitting a Continuous Parametric Distribution to BBL Loss Data:
Lognormal (α, β), α = 411736.7, β = 2271727
Fig. A.3: Overlay of a histogram plot of the data with a density function of the fitted distribution.
(b) Overlay of the cumulative frequency plots of the data and the fitted distribution.
(c)(P–P) plot (d) (Q–Q) plot.
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A.4 Fitting a Continuous Parametric Distribution to TBL Loss Data:
Lognormal (α, β), α = 1043960, β = 6121955
Fig. A.4: Overlay of a histogram plot of the data with a density function of the fitted distribution.
(b) Overlay of the cumulative frequency plots of the data and the fitted distribution.
(c)(P–P) plot (d) (Q–Q) plot.
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Appendix B
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS TABLES
B.1 Table B.1 generated by Excel2LaTeX from excel sheet ’1.Statistics’
B.2 Table B.2 generated by Excel2LaTeX from sheet ’1.Statistics’
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Range Name Frequency Input Severity Input
Variable Name Banking Trading Banking Trading
Mean 1 5 415 097 1 043 233
Minimum - - 13 32
Maximum 24 29 1 177 155 760 2 473 823 580
St. dev. 2 3 2 463 135 6 503 148
Variance 3 9 6 067 032 552 934 42 290 932 008 098
CofV 1 1 6 6
Skewness 2 1 148 117
Kurtosis 9 4 56 819 32 209
Percentiles
1% - - 970 2 151
8% - 1 5 431 12 326
20% - 3 15 433 35 681
35% - 4 35 997 84 538
50% 1 5 73 581 174 974
65% 1 6 150 194 362 557
80% 2 8 350 837 856 747
95% 5 11 1 561 436 3 905 741
99% 8 14 5 579 903 14 107 303
Tab. B.1: Descriptive Statistics of Input Distributions
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Range Name Aggregate Loss Distribution Estimation
Variable Name Empirical (Monte Carlo) GEV(a,b,c)
Mean 5 998 306 14 785 607
Minimum - -613 897
Maximum 2 007 127 700 2 441 858 287 755
St. dev. 14 106 490 2 488 330 557
Variance 198 993 047 358 932 6 191 788 962 879 870 000
CofV 2 168
Skewness 26 950
Kurtosis 1 741 928 106
Percentiles
1% 4 219 -119 386
8% 303 004 400 089
20% 871 494 995 734
35% 1 723 883 1 805 751
50% 2 874 371 2 910 876
65% 4 602 214 4 730 948
80% 7 849 658 8 740 058
95% 120 192 540 31 129 081
99% 49 259 266 119 991 172
Tab. B.2: Descriptive Statistics of Output Distributions
Appendix C
MISCELLANEOUS FIGURES
C.1 A sample ATAT database
C.2 Data request letter
C.3 The Aggregate Multi Monte Carlo Loss Model for Process Risk
C.4 Raw Data for Process Risk
Appendix C. Miscellaneous figures 93
Fig. C.1: Letter of motivation in support of data request
Appendix C. Miscellaneous figures 94
Fig. C.2: The automated trade amendment tracker (ATAT) loss database platform
Appendix C. Miscellaneous figures 95
Fig. C.3: Model–Process–Risk.xslx
Appendix C. Miscellaneous figures 96
Fig. C.4: Process–Risk–Data.xslx
